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Abstract— The fingerprint has long been used as one of the most 
important biological features in the field of biometrics. It is person-
specific and remain identical though out one’s lifetime. Physically 
uncloneable functions (PUFs) have been used in authentication 
protocols due to the unique physical feature of it. In this paper, we take 
full advantage of the inherent security features of user’s fingerprint 
biometrics and PUFs to design a new user authentication and key 
agreement scheme, namely Bio-AKA, which meets the desired 
security characteristics. To protect the privacy and strengthen the 
security of biometric data and to improve the robustness of the 
proposed scheme, the fuzzy extractor is employed. The scheme 
proposed in the paper can protect user’s anonymity without the use of 
password and allow mutual authentication with key agreement. The 
experimental results show superior robustness and the simplicity of our 
proposed scheme has been validated via our performance and security 
analysis. The scheme can be an ideal candidate for real life applications 
that requires remote user authentication. 
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Traditionally, remote logins are authenticated through 
password authentication scheme where identity and password 
are used by a remote server. The Lamport scheme [1] is a 
typical example of this type of authentication method. The 
scheme used an insecure channel to authenticate remote users. 
Lamport’s system stores all passwords in a table for 
authenticating the legitimacy of users. It could be attacked by 
modifying the password table. Based on ElGamal’s 
cryptosystem [3], Hwang et al [2] improved the scheme by 
introducing a smart card without the need for password table 
being stored. The only requirement is a single secret key. In 
spite of its simplicity, this kind of system can be easily attacked 
by using a forged identity [4]. One way of reducing its 
vulnerability is to introduce a certain fingerprint recognition 
technique into the system, as is proposed in Lee et al. [5]. 
Similar to smart card-based method [2], this Fingerprint-based 
scheme is also based on ElGamal’s cryptosystem and smart 
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card except that the two secret keys have been kept. Although 
the security of the system has been strengthened by verifying 
the legitimate users using their fingerprints, there are some 
obvious weaknesses in Lee’s scheme. It does not allow users to 
modify their password and is still subject to masquerade attack 
[6]. Some improvements to Lee’s scheme have made by Lin et 
al. [6]. One common issue for both the above two schemes [5, 
6] is that they are not based on mutual authentications protocols 
and they only performed user authentication (unilateral 
authentication protocols). Hence, these schemes cannot 
withstand server spoofing attacks. Lin’s scheme has been 
further improved in [7] by adding a security patch to provide 
user and remote server mutual authentications. However, this 
kind of system is still far from secure. In fact, it can be easily 
attacked by using guessed passwords, and is vulnerable to both 
user and server masquerade attacks.  
To develop more secure authentication systems, a kind of 
one-way collision free chaotic hash function was introduced in 
the scheme proposed by Khan et al. [8] in 2008. In this system, 
the remote user authentication phase can be performed using 
biometric fingerprint. Khan’s scheme has lower time 
complexity and less power complexity. So, it can be 
implemented efficiently on mobile devices. However, due to 
the fact that the information in mobile device can be extracted 
by an adversary, this scheme is also vulnerable to the offline 
attack and the masquerade attack. To address this issue, Chen 
et al. [9] proposed an authentication scheme by using both 
fingerprint biometric and password. Further to Chen’s work, 
Truong et al. [10] improved the scheme by bringing in a more 
robust scheme which are not only more resistant to server and 
user spoofing attack, replay attack, but can also protect the 
anonymity of users. However, Truong’s solution is far from 
ideal, relevant security issues are still not fully solved. In fact, 
due to the failing of the three-way challenge-response 
handshake and the three-factor authentication, a malicious user 
can guess the secret key of the server. Hence Khan et al. present 
a solution in [11] which can take the essence of the schemes 
proposed in [9, 10] while their vulnerability to malicious attacks 
is remedied. 
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In 2010, Li et al. [12] proposed a smart-card-based solution 
to solve some essential issues in a remote user authentication 
system. Later, Das [13] identified two main design flaws in Li 
et al.’s scheme. One is that the validity of the password is not 
verified in the login phase, and the other is that the verification 
of the old password is not considered at the stage of password 
resetting. To correct these flaws, Das [13] proposed an 
improvement version to Li et al.’s scheme. However, only 
limited degree of vulnerability to external attacks can be 
reduced with Das’s scheme. Thereby An [14] explored the 
design faults in Das’s scheme, and put forward an improved 
method, which was later investigated by Both Khan et al. [15] 
and Ibjaoun et al. [16]. They identified some issues in An’s 
scheme, and proposed an enhanced version to avoid the 
potential pitfalls involved in An’s scheme. In 2014, Li et al 
proposed an improved method [17] to Das’s scheme which can 
support the session key agreement at the stage of mutual 
authentication to make up the lack of this function in Das’s 
scheme. Unfortunately, this improved scheme does not support 
three-factor authentication and cannot ensure user’s privacy. To 
overcome the weaknesses, Chaturvedi et al. [18] designed an 
authentication and key agreement protocol, which can inherit 
all its original merits. 
A. Related Work 
Unlike identity or password used in traditional remote 
authentication schemes, biometrics are uniquely associated 
with an individual as a native alternative to enable a reliable 
biometric authentication. It offers important advantages over 
passwords and cryptographic keys [12], such as resistant to 
copy or being guessed, hard to be forged, and no necessity from 
users to remember the keys or lose them. For the same reasons, 
however, it is critical to keep the privacy and security of the 
biometrics during the authentication process [19-24]. Once the 
biometrics information is compromised, it is not feasible to 
generate a second one. Hence, for security reasons, the 
biometric information should not be stored in either user or 
server side devices directly which will impose significant risks 
[5-8]. To mitigate the risks, some researchers [9-15] employed 
one-way hash function (OWFH) or keyed hash function (KHF) 
to encrypt biometric before storing it on devices. However, the 
OWHF is sensitive to subtle changes in the inputs, especially 
when human’s fingerprints continue to change slightly over 
time.  Thus, it is unwise to directly use the biometrics as the 
inputs of the cryptographic hash function. To address this 
challenge, the fuzzy extractor (FE) technology [17, 18] are 
employed to perform biometrics verification. The FE first 
extracts a nearly random string K from the biometrics 
information which can tolerate to errors [19, 20]. Then under 
the help of auxiliary information, FE can extract the same K 
even if there are changes in the inputs within an acceptable 
range. However, the auxiliary information is stored in the 
device directly in their scheme, and thus cannot ensure the 
security of users’ biometric privacy. Moreover, as the 
commonly used pairwise templates match with the encrypted 
biometric directly, it has a potential risk of leaking the privacy 
of user’s biometrics information. Zhou et al. [23] proposed a 
Threshold Predicate Encryption scheme to only reveal the 
matched result so no biometric data can be learned. The use of 
adversarial machine learning has been reported in [24], where 
Wang et al. investigated privacy-malicious attacks on the 
preserving vulnerability in a biometric database by using 
critical biometric similarity information in machine learning. 
As the encrypted biometric data is stored in database in [23, 24], 
the risks of biometrics information leakage do exist with these 
approaches. 
Recently, a few Internet of Things (IoT) systems have 
proposed to use physical unclonable functions (PUFs) for 
mutual authentication schemes [25-27]. PUFs are based on the 
random differences in Integrated Circuits (ICs) introduced 
during manufacturing processes. Just like the biometrics of 
human beings (e.g. fingerprints), each PUF carries its unique 
physical characteristics from being produced. Hence, to predict 
and produce a clone of PUF is almost impossible. Researches 
used PUF enabled devices in a remote authentication scheme to 
achieve mutual authentication has been very successful 
benefiting from the fact that this “biometric” cannot be 
duplicated or cloned. However, it is not able to verify the 
identity of the user who uses it. An attempt has been made by 
Gope et al. [26] to input user’s biometric thumb impression into 
the PUF and then generate the biometric key to verify the user 
identity. In the proposed scheme, the fingerprint biometric is 
input directly into PUF during the registration phase and the 
authentication phase. However, it should be noted that this 
scheme does not support noisy PUF environment. As 
mentioned above, the fingerprint biometrics changes slightly 
over time, the result from this scheme is unreliable because the 
subtle perturbations in inputs will cause unpredictable outputs 
of a PUF. Furthermore, the user needs to provide password to 
complete registration and authentication in proposed scheme. 
This will increase the complexity of system and also produce 
security risks to system. 
B. Our Contribution 
To address these flaws in existing biometrics-based remote 
authentication systems, in this paper we propose a secure and 
light-weight two factors user authentication and key agreement 
scheme combining PUFs and fingerprint biometric. To provide 
two-factor authentication to remote authentication systems, in 
addition to user’s biometrics as the first authentication factor, 
we proposes the use of PUFs as the second authentication factor. 
Motivated by the recent success of PUF-based light-weight 
mutual authentication in IoT systems, PUFs are introduced into 
our scheme to enhance the security of design. Furthermore, the 
user can access the remote system using only his fingerprint and 
does not rely on any passwords. So, the user does not have to 
remember and update his/her password. Our proposed scheme 
to combine PUFs and fingerprint biometric can solve the 
problems mentioned above and also meet the desired 
requirements of security and efficiency. The key contributions 
of this paper can be summarized as below: 
(1) Design of a two factors user authentication and key 
agreement scheme combining PUFs and fingerprint biometric, 
which has high security, convenience and efficiency. 
(2) Both user and device have their own unique physical 
feature, which can provide the key security properties. 
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(3) No need to store user’s biometric information in device, 
which can completely avoid the risk of leaking biometric 
information. 
(4) Extraction or reconstruction of the key from the biometric 
or the PUFs response with noise by using the FE. 
(5) A password free scheme for registration, login, 
authentication and secure session key establishment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: a brief review 
of fuzzy extractor and PUFs will be given in Section II. Section 
III describes the detailed scheme. The proposed two factors user 
authentication and key agreement are presented in Section IV. 
Section V analyses the security and performance informally and 
formally. Section VI concludes the paper.  
The notations used in this paper are defined in Table I. 
TABLE I 
NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER 
Symbol Description 
Ui The user 
S Server 
IDi Identity of Ui 
h(·) One-way hash function 
FE Fuzzy extractor 
|| Concatenation operation 
PUFi Physically uncloneable functions of Ui 
Ci Challenge of Ui 
Ri Response of the respective PUF for Ci 
Fi The fingerprint template of Ui 
⊕ Exclusive-OR operation 
SK Session key between Ui service 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
We briefly introduce the preliminary background of PUF, FE 
and the System Model in this section. 
A. Fuzzy Extractor 
A fuzzy extractor [19, 20] is defined as a pair of functions 
FE.Gen(·) and FE.Rec(·), corresponding to the key generation 
and reproduction procedures respectively. FE.Gen(·) is a 
basically a probabilistic function, which generates a key K and 
an auxiliary data A from an input D, i.e., (K, A) = FE.Gen(D). 
In contrast, FE.Rec(·) is a deterministic function, which 
reconstructs the key K from a given data A and any noisy input 
D’, where D’ is an approximation of D subject to satisfaction of 
Hamming distance between D and D’, i.e. dis(D,D’)≤t. t is a 
threshold. Formally, (K, A) = FE.Gen(D) à K=FE.Rec(D’, A). 
It's obvious that the success of FE relies on the similarity 
between original data and the noisy input data. 
B. PUF 
A PUF is a kind of hardware function implementation circuit 
with intrinsic chip characteristics of uniqueness and 
randomness.  A PUF circuit can be understood as the fingerprint 
of a chip, which is achieved according to the process parameter 
deviation introduced in the chip manufacturing process. So, a 
PUF is a physical system interacting in a very sophisticated way 
with challenges and produces unique but unpredictable 
responses. This physical system is built by an uncontrollable 
random process, and thus is hard to clone. Furthermore, 
mathematical modeling of the PUF is almost impossible to be 
built because it is based on many sophisticated interactions. So, 
it’s not possible to use cryptographic primitives to reproduce a 
PUF. Essentially, a PUF uses an exceedingly complex physical 
system [27] to generate a set of responses from a set of 
challenges. Mathematically, the PUF can be expressed in the 
following form, 
          (1) 
Where R is the corresponding set of responses given C as the 
set of all possible challenges. The function is derived from the 
intrinsic randomness of the manufacturing process of IC, and 
cannot be controlled. So, PUF is entirely relied on the random 
process in the IC manufacturing, and it is actually impossible to 
make two entirely identical PUFs. The same response will be 
produced by a PUF if the challenge is the same; but the 
responses will be different if two different PUFs are given the 
same challenge. However, the output of the PUF may contain 
noise due to the changes of working environment (e.g. 
temperature, air humidity). To support noisy PUF environment, 
the concept of FE is introduced. Let us assume 
 as a set of PUFs and 
 as the set of challenges, then a 
-secure PUF needs to meet the following requirements [26, 27]: 
   (2) 
   (3) 
  (4) 
Where is the Hamming distance and  is the min-
entropy of the PUF output. 
C. System Model 
The Fig. 1 describes our system model for mobile user 
remote authentication. The mobile devices used in the system 
can be in the form of any smart devices such as tablets, mobile 
phones and laptops, which are the most frequently used in the 
remote authentication system. In terms of security, the 
authentication system can achieve two-way secure 
communication between user’s mobile devices and serve. In 
this model the mobile device is equipped with a PUF and 
fingerprint sensor, and the server is considered as the trusted 
party. 
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
Here we describe the details of our novel PUF and fingerprint 
biometrics based remote user authentication and key agreement 
(Bio-AKA) scheme. The proposed scheme supports remote 
user authentication without password and session key 
agreement between the user and the server after the 
authentication. We use fuzzy extractor to generate a user secret 
key Ku from fingerprint biometric template captured in 
registration phase, and recover Ku from fingerprint biometric 
template captured in login phase. In our scheme the biometric 
information of users will not be stored on any devices, which 
can completely eliminate the risk of biometric information 
( )R PUF C=
( ) ( ){ }1 , , MP PUF PUF= × ×!
{ } { }1, , . . 0,1
k
N nC C C s t nC= " Î! ( ), , , ,d h l l e
rP ( ( ), ( )) 1 ,
         1 , ;1
H m p n pd PUF C PUF C d
m n M m n p N
eé ù> ³ -ë û
£ £ Ù ¹ £ £
rP ( ( ), ( )) 1 ,
         1 ,1 ,
H m p m qd PUF C PUF C d
m M p q N p q
eé ù> ³ -ë û
£ £ £ £ Ù ¹
r
ˆP ( ( ), ( )) 1 ,
     1 , ;1 ,
m p n qH PUF C PUF C
m n M m n p q N p q
l e¥é ù> ³ -ë û
£ £ Ù ¹ £ £ Ù ¹
Hd Ĥ¥
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being leaked. The proposed scheme includes three phases: 
registration, login and the mutual authentication and key 
agreement phases. 
 
Figure.1.  System model. 
A. Registration Phase 
User is required to complete registration procedure before 
being authenticated. The communication between the server S 
and the user Ui in this stage is required to be completed over a 
secure channel. Fig. 2 illustrates detailed steps for how to 
register. 
Step R1: User Ui picks an identity IDi, and inputs his/her 
fingerprint on a mobile device. Then Ui extracts fingerprint 
biometric template Fi from input fingerprint and randomly 
generates a challenge Ci and a random number N. 
Step R2: Ui computes the PUF outputs  and 
obtains the user secret key Ku and the auxiliary data FA from 
fingerprint biometric template Fi using the procedure FE.Gen(·) 
i.e., . And then the Ui computes 
,  and . 
Finally, Ui sends  along with a request for 
registration Regreq via a secure channel to the server. It is 
noteworthy that Ku is not disclosed to any others in subsequent 
communications because it depends only on the biometric of 
user. 
Step R3: The server first checks the uniqueness of the AIDi 
Upon receipt of the Regreq sent by the user Ui. Then the server 
generates randomly a private key Ks and a user unique random 
number e. Next, the server computes . Finally, 
the server completes the registration by sending Ei to Ui by a 
secure channel.  
Step R4: Upon receipt of the secret message Ei by the server, 
Ui computes the secret information , 
 and  for securing network 
communications in future. Finally, the user stores 
 into his mobile device. 
As noted from above, we don’t store the biometric 
information Fi directly stored on user’s mobile device, and we 
only stores the encrypted auxiliary data extracted from the 
fingerprint template using the Fuzzy Extractor. In addition, our 
scheme does not need to use password. So it can provide a more 
secure and convenient user authentication scheme. 
 
 
Figure.2. Bio-AKA: Registration phase. 
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Figure.3.  Bio-AKA: Login, authentication and key agreement phases. 
B. Login Phase 
Fig. 3 shows the login phase procedures. First a user 
attempting to login a server S remotely, he/she has to enter 
his/her identity IDi, and imprints fingerprint via his/her mobile 
device. Then the following steps will be executed by the mobile 
device with a fingerprint template Fi extracted by the device. 
Step L1: Using the IDi entered by user, Ui first computes 
, and then decodes , obtains 
the auxiliary data FA.  
Step L2: Extracting the secret key Xu using the procedure 
FE.Rec(·) i.e., .  
Step L3: Ui computes a key-hash response , 
and then verifies if the response match V. If they are not match, 
the user login is terminated. Only when the user enters identity 
correctly and offers correct his personal biometric template 
which is close to that used in registration phase will the 
verification be successfully passed. 
Step L4: Ui generates a nonce Nu, and then comutes 
. After computing W, it computes , 
which is equal to . Next, it immediately computes 
,  and , 
. The secret value maintained by S is hashed 
and used to mask Nu. 
Ui completes the login request by sending the message 
 to S. 
C. Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Phase 
Following the message  to request login, Step A1 
to Step A7 will be executed by the remote server S to realize the 
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Step A1: S first decodes Nu by computing  
followed by computing  from the secrete message  
i.e., . 
Step A2: The server checks the validity of . If  is 
valid, then it locates user’s identity  in its database and 
instantly retrieve and loads the challenge-response pair . 
Otherwise, S terminates this session. 
Step A3: S first computes a key-hash response 
, and then verifies whether it is equal to C2. If 
this verification fails, S terminates the session.  
Step A4: S generates a nonce Ns, and then computes 
 using the secret values maintained by it and 
subsequently computes , 
 and then sends a composite response 
message {C3, C4, C5} to Ui. 
Step A5: Upon receipt of the message in step 4, Ui first 
decodes Ns by computing , and then verifies 
whether the key-hash response  is equal to 
. If not, Ui terminate the session. 
Step A6: Ui obtains original challenge  by computing 
 using the secret values maintained 
by it and S. Next, Ui computes the PUF response  to challenge 
 i.e., , and subsequently obtains the key-element 
Xus and auxiliary data A using the procedure FE.Gen(·) i.e., 
. Next, the mobile device computes 
, the session key  
and . Finally, Ui sends the composite 
message {C6, C7} to S. 
Step A7: Upon receiving Ui’s message {C6, C7}, S first 
computes and decodes the auxiliary data  
using the secret values maintained by it, then using the 
reconstruction function FE.Rec(·) to obtains the key-element
. And then S achieves the session key SK by 
computing . Finally, S verifies 
whether the key-hash response  is equal to C7. If 
they are different, then S terminates this session. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Both informal and formal analyses have been performed to 
ensure the security of our scheme. The security of our scheme 
is proved theoretically by using the BAN logic [28]. 
A. Informal Security Analysis 
In the analysis, we have respected the facts that the smart 
mobile devices are prone to be tampered [29-33], as a result, the 
information stored in the devices are insecure. Hence it is 
reasonable to assume the information on mobile device can be 
stolen by a hacker Ua. Furthermore, it’s possible the 
communication channel between the server and the device can 
be intercepted and controlled by the hacker as the transmission 
is made over public channels. 
We claim our scheme is secure and can satisfy the following 
propositions. 
Proposition 1 User anonymity and untraceability protection. 
Proof. In our scheme, the real identity IDi of the user is 
enciphered with user’s secret key Ku extracted from biometric 
and a random secret number N in registration phase. To obtain 
IDi from , Ku and N are essential which are 
known only to the user. As the biometric information is unique 
secret to the user only. So, an attacker cannot obtain the real IDi 
value, even the server cannot retrieve it. In login phase, Ui sends 
 to S, and the parameters in this message are 
dynamic because user’s mobile device generates  randomly 
for each session, which reduces the possibility of traceability. 
Thus the proposed scheme can provide untraceability and user 
anonymity hence further protect the user’s privacy. 
Proposition 2 Withstanding both online and offline password 
guessing attacks. 
Proof. The proposed scheme do not need password support. It 
only use the secret key Ku extracted from biometric of user to 
encrypt the user-end data. Therefore, an attacker never have 
chances to perform password guessing attacks. As a result, there 
is no risk for password guessing attacks. 
Proposition 3 Withstanding stolen mobile device attacks. 
Proof. Granting that an attacker Ua has stolen the mobile device 
of Ui, he/she can extract the information  stored 
in it. As in our scheme, neither the user identity or biometric 
information will be stored on the device, hence no valuable data 
can be obtained from the device. In addition, the user identify 
is not contained in any message in plain text forms, this prevents 
sensitive information leakage. All the obtained values such as 
Ei, V, ,  are safeguarded using OWFH, where 
, , , 
. In order to get IDi from , Ua 
requires N values, the values of N, in turn, depends on the value 
of IDi. As a result, this becomes a paradoxical chicken-egg 
problem. If Ua would like to obtain IDi from other data extracted 
from mobile device, he not only requires N but also requires FA 
or Ku. It is impossible to get FA or Ku without obtaining user 
biometric. So, the proposed scheme is secure against mobile 
device stolen attack. 
Proposition 4 Withstanding insider attacks. 
Proof. In our scheme, Ui freely selects his identity and nonce N 
and does not send IDi in plain text during user registration 
phase, and never leaks his biometric Fi. Ui submits only AIDi, 
W to server, where , . It is 
impossible in proposed scheme to obtain secret values {Ku, N} 
because this is protected by the one-way hash. Therefore, no 
insider can extract the user’s secret information. In addition, the 
secret value Ku has to be extracted through biometric 
information which is user’s unique secret that the insider cannot 
obtain it. So, even anyone who has access to the server is unable 
to get user’s IDi without the secret information Ku and nonce N. 
This proves our scheme is free of insider attacks. 
Proposition 5 Withstanding replay attacks. 
Proof. We assume that Ua somehow intercepts message 
 from an insecure channel sent by user Ui to server S. 
Then, Ua wants to gain access to the server S by replaying this 
message. However, Ua will fail to achieve his aim by this 
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approach because the nonce Nu changes in each session. The 
message  received by S, where , 
 and , obviously includes a 
nonce Nu from Ui. In order to complete authentication, S must 
send back Nu to Ui as the response nonce and Nu is hidden in the 
messages C4, C5, where ,
. In this way, the proposed scheme can 
withstand replay attacks. 
Proposition 6 Withstanding user masquerade attacks. 
Proof. Assuming a legitimate but malicious user Ua wants to 
masquerade another legitimate user Ui, the proposed scheme 
withstands the masquerade attack even if Ua has obtained the 
information  stored in the mobile device of Ui, 
(the symbols of items are distinguished by corresponding 
subscript, the same below.) In addition, Ua can obtain these 
information  from his mobile device. Using 
these information, Ua only can get  by computing 
 using his secret values  and . However, a 
valid login message has to be generated in order to impersonate 
the legitimate user Ui. However, Ua is not able to obtain the 
secret information IDi of Ui, this further protects the more secret 
values as Ni, FAi to be breached. Moreover, even if Ua has 
obtained the key secret values Ni and FAi, he still fails to 
generate a valid login message. Ua practically impossible to 
obtain the secret key Kui since the Fi is belong to user only. As 
a result, Ua cannot compute , C1 and C2. So, the proposed 
scheme is secure to user masquerade attacks. 
Proposition 7 Withstanding server spoofing attack. 
Proof. Even if Ua is a legitimate user and he can intercept all 
messages from a public channel, he still fails to masquerade as 
S in proposed scheme. If Ua wants to masquerade as S to spoof 
Ui, he needs to generate a valid response message {C3, C4, C5}, 
where , ,
. However, Ua is impossible to obtain 
 even if he can extract all information stored in mobile 
device of Ui and intercept all messages sent from Ui. This is due 
to the fact that  is impossible to get. In addition, Ua unable to 
obtain . Moreover, even if Ua has obtained the key secret 
values  and , he still fails to generate session key SK and 
spoof user Ui. This is because he cannot obtain  so that he 
cannot reconstruct the secret key value  shared by both Ui 
and S. 
Proposition 8 Withstanding man-in-the-middle attacks. 
Proof. Suppose the user login message  has been 
intercepted by an attacker Ua during the login phase, and he/she 
intends to perform a man-in-the-middle attack by modifying the 
 message. Note that  and 
. If Ua can guess  
and correctly, he can modify  and 
 and sends this message  
to S to complete the authentication at the server side. However, 
it’s impossible to get both  and  for an attacker Ua. 
As a result, Ua has no way to modify properly all the transmitted 
messages between S and Ui during either the login or 
authentication phases. So, our scheme withstands man-in-the-
middle attacks. 
Proposition 9 Withstanding known key secrecy attacks.  
Proof. Suppose an attacker Ua has obtained a session key SK* 
being communicated in previous communications, but it is still 
not possible for him to construct the current session key 
 between Ui and S. To construct the 
current session key, Ua needs to get the nonce values Nu and Ns 
generated by Ui and S. In our scheme, new nonce values are 
generated in each session. In addition, Nu and Ns cannot be 
computed without knowing the value . In addition, Ua 
also cannot obtain AIDi and Xus because they are computed in 
each session using the biometric and PUF of user. So, it is 
impossible to obtain these secret values simultaneously for an 
attacker. Therefore, our scheme is against the known key 
secrecy attacks. 
Proposition 10 Withstanding session-specific temporary 
information attacks. 
Proof. Assume an attacker Ua has managed to know the 
temporary information Nu and Ns, and then he intends to 
construct the session key SK. However, the session key 
 cannot be computed without knowing 
the value Xus. Since the value of Xus is the shared secret of Ui 
and S and it must be generated by using user’s PUF in each 
session. So, Ua is not able to get it. This shows that the proposed 
scheme is secure from the session-specific temporary 
information attack. 
Proposition 11 Perfect forward secrecy. 
Proof. Perfect forward secrecy ensures that Ua cannot construct 
the session keys generated in previous sessions, even if the long 
term key K of Ui is stolen. We use the session nonce values Nu 
and Ns to compute the session key  and 
use different nonce values in each session. Therefore, it is 
impossible to compute the session key SK without knowing Nu 
and Ns. Moreover, even if Ua intercepts all the information 
communicated over the public channels, he/she cannot compute 
SK because the values Xus is not known to him/her. Even if he 
get the challenge Ci, he needs to use the PUFi equipped in 
mobile device of user to compute response  in each session 
and thus to obtain Xus. But all this is impossible. Therefore, Ua 
cannot reconstruct the established session key. Hence our 
scheme has perfect forward secrecy. 
Proposition 12 Supports mutual authentication. 
Proof. In our scheme, the user Ui challenges the server S by 
sending the message C1 to S and S responds to the challenge by 
sending the message C4 to Ui. On the other hand, the server S 
challenges the user Ui by sending the message C4 to Ui and Ui 
responds to the challenge by sending the massage C7 to S. It is 
clear that only the legitimate user Ui with the correct biometric 
Fi and PUF PUFi can successfully complete these tasks. 
Moreover, the proposed scheme withstands masquerade attack 
in both user side and server side, so it ensures mutual 
authentication. 
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Proposition 13 Provision of session key agreement. 
Proof. In proposed scheme, both user Ui and server S need to 
independently compute the session  
for subsequent communications. It was only when the session 
keys computed by Ui and S are identical that they can 
communicate securely using SK. Therefore, our scheme can 
provide session key agreement. 
A. Formal Analysis  
We use the BAN logic to formally analyze the security 
features of our scheme. The BAN logic can be constructed 
based on some basic postulates and assumptions and it is 
commonly used in communication protocol analysis. Table II 
has summarized the various basic notations in our logic analysis 
used by the BAN logic. 
TABLE II 
BASIC NOTATIONS OF THE BAN LOGIC 
Basic notation Meaning 
 Principal P believes the statement X 
 Principal P sees the statement X 
 Principal P once said the statement X 
 Principal P has jurisdiction over the 
statement X 
 Formula X is fresh 
 P and Q use the shared key K to 
communicate. 
 K is a public key of P 
 Formula X is a secret known only to P and Q 
 Formula X is encrypted using key K 
 Formula X is combined with formula Y. 
The BAN logic uses the following logical postulates as 
formal rules: 
R1. Message meaning rule 1:  
R2. Message meaning rule 2:  
R3. Nonce verification rule:  
R4. Jurisdiction rule:  
R5: Freshness rule:  
R6. Belief rule:  




The following four security goals are expected to achieve the 





The main steps to prove that the proposed protocol has 
achieved mutual authentication between Ui and S using above 
assumptions and rules are as follows: 
S1.  
Based on the assumed A3, the message meaning rule R1 can 
be applied along with S1 to yield the following: 
S2.  
Moreover, we have the assumption A1, the freshness rule R5 
applies and yields: 
S3.  
According to S2 and S3, the nonce-verification rule R3 
applies and yields: 
S4.  
According to S4 and A1, A2, A5 and 
, the freshness rule R5 and nonce-
verification rule R3 apply and yield: 
S5.  (Goal 1) 
According to S5 and A7, jurisdiction rule R4 applies and 
yields: 
S6.  (Goal 3) 
S7.  
According to A6 and S7, the message meaning rule R2 apply 
and yield: 
S8.  
Moreover, we have the assumption A2, the freshness rule R5 
applies and yields: 
S9.  
According to S8 and S9, the nonce verification rule R3 
applies and yields: 
S10.  
According to belief rule R6 and S10, we can obtain: 
S11.  (Goal 2) 
According to S11 and A8, jurisdiction rule R4 applies and 
yields: 
S12.  (Goal 4) 
The above goals 1-4 clearly indicate the our scheme achieves 
the mutual authentication between Ui and S. 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of our 
scheme. Comparisons have been made with other related 
biometrics-based schemes to show the effectiveness and 
excellent security features of our scheme. 
A. Discussion on User’s Biometric and Device’s PUF 
The biometrics are uniquely associated with an individual. 
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Fingerprint is one of the most important biometrics and it has 
stability, uniqueness and convenience. Unlike traditional 
password, it is hard to copy and forge. However, if you lose it, 
it is lost forever. So, great loss will be brought to these users 
once their fingerprint information are leaked. Many researchers 
tried everything to protect the fingerprint information from the 
attacker in the various attack environment. Obviously, these 
methods [5-8] stored fingerprint template directly into device 
are most at risk. In order to avoid the risk, the authors [9-15] 
store fingerprint template encrypted by hash function into 
devices. However, as discussed in Section I A, the fingerprints 
may change slightly over time and this subtle change may cause 
changes in the output of the sensitive secure one way hash 
function. Thus, these schemes are not realistic. In [17, 18], the 
fuzzy extractor technology are employed to extract the secret 
key and auxiliary information from fingerprint template and 
store them into device. However, the auxiliary information is 
stored in the device directly in their scheme, and thus cannot 
ensure the privacy of the users. In [26], the user’s biometric 
thumb impression is input directly into the PUF as the challenge 
to generate the biometric key. It is unrealistic due to the slight 
variations in biometrics fingerprints. Furthermore, the user need 
to provide password in this scheme. 
In our proposed scheme, the FE technology are employed to 
improve the robustness of mutual authentication and key 
agreement. The security and privacy of user’s biometrics can be 
further improved by extracting the secret key and auxiliary 
information from fingerprint template using FE. Both the data 
extracted from fingerprint template are encrypted and stored 
into device. As described in Section II A, the robust stability of 
the FE algorithm are largely dependent on the Hamming 
distance between registered fingerprint template and 
authenticated fingerprint template. The distance need to be 
small enough in terms of the success of the proposed scheme. 
In fact the accuracy and reliability of the extracted fingerprint 
template depend on the quality of input fingerprint image. To 
meet this requirement, the input fingerprint quality need to be 
improved. Luckily we can obtain the desired fingerprint with 
high quality from the input fingerprint with noise by using 
fingerprint enhancement methods [34]. 
The proposed scheme has been designed without providing a 
password for the convenience of the users. In the proposed 
scheme, the user’s mobile device needs to equip a PUF which 
can generate a shared secret key for the user and the server. To 
improve the robustness of the proposed scheme, we first extract 
a key from user’s fingerprint template, then use this key to 
encrypt the challenge and store the encrypted challenge on the 
server side which the user knows nothing about it. When mutual 
authentication and key agreement phases are executed, the 
server sends the encrypted challenge to the user for the user to 
decrypt using his/her biometrics information. The user can get 
the challenge only when he imprint his fingerprint correctly. 
Then the user generates the exact response using the PUF 
equipped in his mobile device and extracts the secret key and 
an auxiliary vector from the response using FE.Gen(·). The user 
sends the encrypted auxiliary vector to the server and the server 
needs to decrypt it using its private key. The server then uses 
the stored response and the decrypted auxiliary vector using the 
FE.Rec(·) to generate the secret key. Only when the response-
auxiliary pair matches, the secret keys generated by user and 
server are identical. Only in this way the session key can be 
generated to complete the mutual authentication and key 
agreement phases. By doing so, our scheme can provide robust 
authentication and key agreement scheme without using 
password. Comparison for protecting user’s biometrics and 
password is provided in Table III. 
Biometric technologies has achieved great progress in the 
recent years, and has been successfully applied in user 
authentication scheme to authenticate the user’s identity. PUF 
is a kind of device-unique fingerprint, it provide an effective 
way to uniquely identify each device and to extract 
cryptographic keys used for strong device authentication. 
Taken together, the feasibility of such a secure two factors user 
authentication and key agreement scheme proposed in this 
paper can be verified. 
B. Performance Comparisons 
The list of desired security properties is shown in Table IV. We 
compare our Bio-AKA scheme with state of the art biometrics-
based schemes against this security properties. As can be 
observed from Table IV, our scheme is the only one that 
satisfies all security properties whilst other schemes are 
vulnerable to at least one or more security attacks.  
To further analyze the computational performance of our 
scheme, a comparison on the computational costs in all phases 
between the proposed scheme and other relevant schemes has 
been conducted. The comparison results are summarized in 
Table V. In the Table V, TPUF represents the PUF operation cost, 
Tm is the modular exponentiations calculation cost and Th the 
time complexity for hashing function. It is worth noting that 
although our scheme has slightly higher computational costs 
comparing to others [9-15], it provides the most comprehensive 
security features that can withstand the known various attacks 
with balanced computational efficiency to mutual 
authentication and key agreements. Furthermore, there is no use 
of password involved in our proposed scheme. Therefore, in 
terms of security, convenience and efficiency, the proposed 
scheme is the most appropriate and practical scheme amongst 
the related biometrics-based schemes [6, 9-15, 17, 18]. 
To more rigorously evaluate the performance of our scheme 
with respect to [6, 9-15, 17, 18], simulation of the cryptographic 
operations has been conducted. The user’s device is a HTC One 
smartphone and the Server is an Intel Core i5-4300 machine. 
The execution time of the cryptographic operations has been 
estimated by using the JCE library [35] for all related schemes. 
In addition, the 128-bit arbiter PUF has been used for PUF 
operation and BCH code [36] has been adopted for FE.Gen (.) 
and FE.Rec (.) operations. According to our simulation, we 
found the following outcomes: each hash operation (Th) takes 
0.026 ms at the user’s device and 0.011 ms at the server side; 
each PUF operation (TPUF ) takes 0.13 ms at the user’s device; 
each FE.Gen (.) operation takes 2.67 ms at user’s device and 
FE.Rec (.) operation takes 3.35 ms at the server; each modular 
operation ( Tm ) takes 21.86 ms at user’s device and 14.6 ms at 
the server. Now, based on the simulation results, the execution 
of the authentication phase takes 6.35ms in total where 2.93 ms 
was spent on the user’s device (5Th+1TPUF+1FE.Gen (∙)) and 
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TA BLE III 
COMPARISON FOR PROTECTING USER’S BIOMETRICS AND PASSWORD 
 [6] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [17] [18] Our 
F1 YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
F2 NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO 
F3 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
F4 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
F5 YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES - 
F1: Stores fingerprint template into user devices directly 
F2: Stores fingerprint template encrypted by hash function into devices 
F3: Stores the data extracted from fingerprint template using FE into devices 
F4: No password required 
F5: Provides change-password 
TABLE IV 
COMPARISON OF THE SECURITY PROPERTIES 
Security properties [6] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [17] [18] Our 
Protects user anonymity NO NO YES YES NO NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Withstands online password guessing 
attack YES NO NO - NO NO NO YES - - YES 
Withstands offline password guessing 
attack - NO NO YES NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Withstands stolen mobile device/smart 
card attack YES YES NO YES NO NO YES - YES - YES 
Withstands insider attack YES YES YES YES NO NO YES - YES YES YES 
Withstands replay attack YES NO YES YES NO YES NO - NO YES YES 
Withstands user masquerade attack YES NO NO YES NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Withstands server spoofing attack NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES YES - YES 
Withstands man-in-the-middle attack YES YES YES YES NO YES NO - YES - YES 
Withstands known key secrecy attack YES YES YES YES YES YES - - YES YES YES 
Withstands temporary information attack NO - - - YES - - - NO YES YES 
Achieves perfect forward secrecy YES - - YES YES - YES - YES YES YES 
Supports mutual authentication NO YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Provides session key agreement YES NO YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
No time synchronization NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES 
TABLE V 
COMPUTATIONAL COST COMPARISONS 
Scheme Registration phase Login phase Authentication phase Total 
User Server 
[6] 1Th+1Tm 2Th+2Tm - 1Th+2Tm 4Th+5Tm 
[9] 3Th 3Th 2Th 3Th 11Th 
[10] 4Th 3Th 3Th 5Th 15Th 
[11] 5Th 4Th 3Th 6Th 18Th 
[12] 3Th 2Th 2Th 3Th 10Th 
[13] 3Th 2Th 3Th 5Th 13Th 
[14] 3Th 3Th 2Th 4Th 12Th 
[15] 4Th 3Th 2Th 5Th 14Th 
[17] 3Th+1FE.Gen(∙) 3Th+1Tm+1FE.Rec(∙) 3Th+1Tm 5Th+2Tm 14Th+4Tm+1FE.Gen(∙)+1FE.Rec(∙) 
[18] 3Th+2Tm+1FE.Gen(∙) 3Th+2Tm+1FE.Rec(∙) 2Th+1Tm 4Th+3Tm 12Th+8Tm+1FE.Gen(∙)+1FE.Rec(∙) 
Our 7Th+1TPUF+1FE.Gen(∙) 6Th+1FE.Rec(∙) 5Th+1TPUF+1FE.Gen(∙) 7Th+1FE.Rec(∙) 25Th+2TPUF+2FE.Gen(∙)+2FE.Rec(∙) 
 
3.42 ms was spent on the server (7Th+1FE.Rec(·)). This is 
significantly less than the time reported in [6], [17], and [18] as 
these schemes are based on the computationally expensive 
modular operation. On the other hand, even though, the 
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schemes presented in [9-15] takes less time than the proposed 
scheme, but according to Table III and Table IV they cannot 
ensure many imperative security properties. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the paper, following the analysis of the pitfalls of the 
existing biometrics-based remote user authentication schemes, 
we proposed a new Bio-AKA scheme which combines PUF and 
fingerprint biometric to provide a secure two factors user 
authentication and key agreement scheme. We explored the 
inherent security properties of PUFs and biometrics and how 
our scheme is capable of achieving the desired security 
characteristics. Without storing biometric information on the 
device, we have managed to develop a scheme that can 
completely eliminate the risk of leaking user’s biometric 
information. Fuzzy extractor is employed to improve the 
robustness of the proposed scheme. Performance analyses have 
been performed to prove our scheme can withstand various 
known security attacks including online and offline password 
guessing attach, stolen mobile device and smart card attack, 
replay attack, user/server masquerade attack, man in the middle 
attack, known key secrecy attack, temporary information 
attack, and insider attack. Meanwhile, our scheme protects user 
anonymity, provides session key agreement, supports mutual 
authentication and achieves perfect forward secrecy. The 
scheme is robust and remarkably convenient without the need 
for password. Furthermore, the scheme can still provide 
security even for some extreme situations such as the mobile 
device being stolen by adversary attacker or the messages being 
intercepted over insecure channels. All the above features have 
shown the validity of our scheme for practical real life 
applications for remote user authentication.  
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